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When Does the State Listen?
Miguel Loureiro, Aalia Cassim, Terence Darko,  
Lucas Katera and Nyambura Salome*
Abstract In this article, we look at four cases of key historical policies in 
Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania to examine how states engage 
with citizen voices. The policies all took place in contexts of political 
change and major junctures of democratisation. We identify three kinds of 
moments when the state listens: hearing moments, when it engages with 
citizen voices but does not change the way it acts; consultation moments, 
when it engages with citizen voices through two-way dialogue, resulting 
in one-sided action; and concertation moments, when coalitions between 
reform-minded officials and politicians and organised citizen voices engage 
in two-way dialogue and action for accountable governance. Concertation 
moments occurred when there was a shared sense of urgency and a 
common goal across state and non-state actors, and despite different 
understandings of accountable governance. But concertation moments are 
also laborious and temporary, part of larger, ever-changing policy processes, 
and often states revert to consultation or hearing.
1 Introduction
The focus of  the Making All Voices Count (MAVC) programme1 is 
the narrowing of  the state–citizen communication gap. State–citizen 
communication is an important element of  social justice – the fair 
distribution of  opportunities, privileges and wealth within a society. 
Growing social inequalities, lack of  proper public services, and denial 
of  basic human rights all act to widen existing gaps between states 
and citizens. Key to bridging these gaps is ensuring not only that 
citizen voices are heard, but also that government has the capacity and 
incentive to listen and respond. Much of  the literature on accountability 
focuses on citizen voices, but there is a need to bring more of  the state 
back into the equation. Turning MAVC on its head, we chose to look 
at the state and see when and how it listens, to which actors; and why, 
at times, it chooses not to listen. In other words, we chose to look for 
instances of  accountable governance, when the state can be accountable 
and responsive to citizens’ voices.
We interviewed key actors across the state–citizen spectrum involved in 
landmark social justice policy processes across four countries – Ghana 
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(national health insurance), Kenya (digitalisation of  governance), South 
Africa (social protection) and Tanzania (primary education) – trying to 
trace moments in policy creation, revision and implementation when 
the state listened. We chose these cases as they happened at major 
junctures of  the democratisation process of  these four countries: the 
first democratic transfer of  power in Ghana; the first elections under 
the new Kenyan constitution, in the aftermath of  the ethnic electoral 
violence of  2007–08; the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 
South Africa; and the first multi-party elections in Tanzania.
We noticed some similarity in the conditions that made groups and 
individuals within the state more receptive to collaboration, even 
challenge, from civil actors. One was a common sense of  urgency, a sense 
of  public and political pressure to drastically change old policies, or come 
up with new ones. The other was the sense of  a common goal for an 
accountable, responsive state – even if  different actors understood this in 
different ways. What we noticed as we delved further into these four cases 
was that the state listened more at moments when actors from both within 
and outside the state met to discuss, collaborate, confront and act.2 We 
label these ‘concertation moments’, when state actors and citizen groups 
meet to go beyond dialogue and try to fix society; not to be confused with 
‘consultation moments’, when state actors listen to citizen groups and act, 
nor with ‘hearing moments’, when state actors hear but do not listen.
In the following section we explain further what we mean by 
concertation moments, before presenting the four case studies and 
analysing the outcomes of  the state listening or not to its citizens.
2 State responsiveness: hearing, listening, concerting
Behind many accountability interventions is the assumption that since 
information is power, citizens armed with information can make public 
officials more accountable, reducing corruption and mismanagement, and 
leading to more accountable, responsive and effective governance (Kosack 
and Fung 2014). But outcomes of  the causation chain which is assumed 
by this underlying hypothesis are rarely examined (McGee and Gaventa 
2011), and while there is significant work on accountability, relatively little 
of  it is theoretical or conceptual. Fox (2015: 353), however, proposes a 
series of  conceptual propositions to inform attempts to increase the impact 
of  social accountability strategies, emphasising the potential synergy 
between (citizen) voice and ‘teeth’, the state’s capacity to respond. We still 
know less about the teeth, and more about the voice. There is a need to 
bring more of  the state back into the equation, and not see it as a problem 
only (Coston 1998); it has the power to support as well as to impede 
social accountability (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg 2015). Fox (2015) calls 
for boosting both public responsiveness and citizen engagement, and we 
concur with his argument that voice alone is not sufficient (Fox 2007).
There is a wide spectrum of  state responses to accountability (Blair 
2011), from opposition through indifference to accommodation; 
but we argue that governments also hear, and listen, and ‘concert’. 
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Concertation moments happen when there are coalitions between 
reform-minded public officials and organised and empowered 
constituents; they are what Fox (2007) calls the social foundations 
of  accountability. These moments go beyond political concertation 
– when political parties across the spectrum of  dialogue agree on 
a common goal; beyond social concertation – when employers and 
employees, mediated by the state, agree on common goals; and beyond 
corporatism. Concertation moments involve most of  the old actors 
present in these three sociopolitical organisational forms, but also new 
actors with new public expectations, ruly and unruly, at times using new 
forms of  engagement to ‘fix’ society, to ‘concert’ it through dialogue and 
public action. This happens when all key actors are brought together, 
building consensus through a series of  negotiations (Coston 1998) – not 
necessarily a common feat.
We further differentiate state responsiveness between hearing, listening 
and concerting. The state hears when it engages with citizens, but it 
does not change the way it acts, paying lip service to ‘openness’ and 
e-governance without changing low levels of  responsiveness. The state 
listens when it engages with citizen voices by consulting them – or 
arranging for some entity to consult them on its behalf  – in a two-sided 
dialogue, but one-sided action. Finally, concertation moments happen 
when state actors and citizen groups engage not only in a two-way 
dialogue, but also act together.
3 Case studies
Our case studies illustrate the circumstances under which concertation 
moments happen, where coalitions between organised and empowered 
constituents and reform-minded public officials attempt to concert society; 
but we also discuss processes where they fail to occur. In light of  Joshi and 
Houtzager’s (2012) observation that most studies on accountability do not 
look at the longer trajectory of  state–citizen relationships (they forget the 
history), nor at the networks that underpin specific social accountability 
initiatives (they forget the social), nor at activities outside the initiative that 
can influence outcomes (they forget the context), we try to touch on all 
these aspects as we describe our case studies.
3.1 Ghana: concertation and consultation for universal health care
Since the early 1990s, democracy in Ghana has consolidated. An array 
of  parties has contested six elections, although two – the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – have 
dominated parliament and the presidency. Keeping these political actors 
in shape are an array of  active civil society organisations (CSOs) and a 
vibrant media. Ghana signed up to the Millennium Development Goals 
and adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper to access debt relief, 
which in turn had some influence on government actions regarding 
public goods. Democratic development, coupled with pressure from 
donor agencies, helped shape political transformation in the relationship 
between the state and its citizens.
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The health sector was affected by these changes. In the mid-1980s, as 
a result of  structural adjustment, Ghana introduced a payment system 
for health care at the point of  service (known as ‘cash-and-carry’). This 
excluded people from accessing health care if  they could not afford it. 
Within a decade, the ill-effects of  the system were widely felt, and the 
media carried frequent reports of  people dying for lack of  medical care, 
patients being refused entry to hospitals, and even stories of  babies and 
their mothers detained in health facilities, unable to pay. With the media 
and CSOs raising their voice on the woes of  the system, the lack of  
universal health care became a central point of  debate during the 2000 
general elections. Alongside the media and civil society were an array of  
actors that had piloted health insurance schemes, including bureaucrats 
from the Ministry of  Health (MoH) that had been involved in feasibility 
studies, faith-based groups that had started insurance schemes in private 
hospitals, and bilateral donors that had implemented community-based 
mutual health insurance schemes.
The NPP made the end of  cash-and-carry a rallying point of  their 
electoral campaign, which proved important in their electoral victory 
in 2000. Lacking a clear direction for the structure and financing of  the 
health insurance they aspired to implement, President Kufuor set up 
a task force to support and advise the MoH on the development of  a 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Members of  the task force 
were either considered to have some technical knowledge on the subject, 
or to be important stakeholders. Most were MoH bureaucrats, but there 
were also representatives from trade unions and the now-defunct Ghana 
Health Care company. Many of  these actors served as catalysts for the 
development of  NHIS by providing useful lessons for what became 
the structure of  health insurance. Two issues, though, were highly 
contentious within the task force: how the state should find the money 
to pay for the scheme, and whether it should be a centralised single-
payer social health insurance system or a decentralised community-
based health insurance system. The task force eventually settled on 
a hybrid arrangement that became the draft policy for wider public 
consultations, and the Minister of  Finance proposed using a portion of  
value-added tax and deductions from social security pensions. Unions 
protested these costing mechanisms until eventually the NPP – pressed 
for time to pass the NHIS law before the 2004 elections – allowed union 
members to enrol for free.
As the draft policy proceeded towards stakeholder consultations, the 
chair of  the task force and the Minister of  Health were both replaced. 
The new incumbents brought new people – other bureaucrats from 
within the MoH, and different ‘expert’ consultants – into the task 
force, and some of  the original members left because of  deviations 
from the agreed hybrid arrangement and political differences with 
the new members. According to the new chair, after listening to the 
views of  various stakeholder forums, the task force had to change the 
original policy draft. The NHIS Act was eventually passed into law 
and implementation begun in 2004 before the elections. The ruling 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 55–68 | 59
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
NPP party were returned again, and vigorously continued NHIS 
implementation of  the scheme with the gradual addition of  districts.
In 2006 the new Minister for Health suspended all services of  the scheme 
and commissioned a financial audit. This came as a result of  general 
complaints from the public and local board members of  the district 
health insurance schemes across the country concerning the operations 
of  scheme managers and start-up consultants (Agyepong and Adjei 
2008; NHIA 2008). The audit findings suggested some mismanagement 
in some districts and, as implementation continued, more challenges 
appeared (Gobah and Zhang 2011). The NDC promised to fix these 
problems and review the scheme to provide further coverage for basic 
care for all if  voted into power. When it won the 2008 elections, it 
appointed a new director to start the process of  resolving the challenges 
and eventual review of  the law. This director commissioned a consulting 
firm to examine the policy and legislative review of  the scheme and hold 
a series of  strategic meetings with several actors. They conducted three 
validation meetings across the country, to deliberate on and validate the 
legislative proposals. During the review, the NDC remained silent about 
NHIS funding arrangements, unable to fulfil one of  its electoral promises 
of  ensuring a one-time payment of  premiums for all. An array of  
CSOs, health-care practitioners, trade unions, faith-based organisations 
and academics are all demanding that the government deal with the 
challenges associated with the scheme. Barely a year before the next 
elections in 2016, the Minister of  Health has commissioned a(nother) 
seven-member technical committee to review the implementation of  the 
NHIS and recommend ways to improve the scheme.
3.2 Kenya: engaging the state through e-government
Kenya’s 2013 election was won by the Jubilee Alliance. Calling themselves 
throughout the campaign ‘the digital team’, and their opponents – the 
Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) – the ‘analogue’ team, 
they promised Kenyan youth, the majority of  both the electorate and the 
unemployed, that their digital revolution would boost employment and fight 
corruption. Yet many of  their information and communications technology 
(ICT)-related policies were already present before 2013: the Government of  
Kenya’s Vision 2030 had highlighted the critical role ICTs play in economic 
development, and aimed for them to generate 8 per cent of  gross domestic 
product (GDP); the development of  the Universal Service Fund Act, to 
universalise access to ICTs throughout the country and improve public 
goods; and the 2010 Constitution, which states that ICTs are to play a key 
role supporting service delivery, making civil servants’ actions transparent 
and accountable, and create jobs. Two years later, the government has 
a plethora of  e-government platforms including a website publicising 
what they do and an e-citizen platform. In addition to these initiatives, all 
ministries have some online information; county governments are shifting to 
digital; one-stop shops (Huduma centres) have opened for those who need 
individualised IT support; and there is an open data platform where census 
data and government reports are uploaded. Government leaders also make 
use of  social media platforms on a daily basis.
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While many Nairobi inhabitants – including students, entrepreneurs 
and professionals – use e-government services online, many others 
across the capital and beyond it are either not aware of  these platforms, 
or lack access to the internet and broadband connectivity. And even for 
those citizens who are able to access the government’s e-services, the 
experience is not always easy. For instance, much of  the online contact 
information provided on different ministry websites is inactive and the 
demand for services in Huduma centres is much greater than the supply.
E-platforms have not only the potential to provide citizens with access 
to public services and information, but also the spaces to enable and 
promote democratic engagement. Yet, only a minority of  Kenyans 
engage with a bureaucrat or a public official through an online 
platform. And although politicians are seen to listen more when citizens 
hold public demonstrations, public outrage in the social media has of  
late made them aware of  citizen demands. Indeed, there is a growing 
number of  young Kenyans who have taken up social media platforms 
to raise critical issues in the government, such as the (mis)use of  
government funds and corruption.
Within the state, it seems that bureaucrats and public officials are less 
enthusiastic about the use of  ICTs for citizen engagement. Their view is 
that citizens do not know how to engage: they use ICTs less for dialogue, 
and more for either complaints or demands. All they hear on their 
e-platforms are criticisms and opposition to their actions or behaviour. 
Bureaucrats – in a twisted understanding of  what demand-driven 
is – say that it is for the public to develop the interest of  e-platforms, 
because otherwise they would in future have no choice if  they wanted 
those services. They feel, having set up these platforms, that it is now 
the citizen’s responsibility to use them. Bureaucrats recognise that they 
have, at times, to listen to citizens, as this is an agenda spearheaded 
by the president. Yet, they often appear to listen to more powerful 
actors instead: the telecom industry (important partners in ICT project 
implementation), donor agencies (who support their initiatives), as 
well as unions and consumer associations. One of  the bureaucrats 
we interviewed observed that while citizens do not know what voice 
and mode to engage the government with, politicians do not help the 
situation, since they too do not know how to listen to their constituents.
Politicians interviewed refuted this point, arguing that they do know 
how to listen. In the words of  one MP, the problem is that ‘citizens do 
not know how to engage with their leaders’. Meant to be key actors in 
the new era of  e-governance, many politicians are fully and explicitly 
aware that most of  their constituents cannot access it, and need other 
forms of  engagement, such as barazas (public forums), if  they are to 
engage at all with their representatives. Politicians often also bear the 
brunt of  fierce personal criticism through e-governance spaces, and 
sometimes simply do not like to hear what citizens have to say. For 
instance, when a group of  youths formed a WhatsApp platform to 
engage with their local MP, so much of  the discussion was personal 
(Endnotes)
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criticism and negative feedback that the MP was put off from listening 
to their underlying, wider problems.
In Kenya, politicians and bureaucrats are interested in using ICTs to 
boost economic growth and get procedures in place to improve service 
delivery, but are less interested in using them to improve the larger 
processes of  governance. The shift from passive citizens accessing public 
services to that of  active citizens engaging the government requires 
a concerted effort on all parts. Yet, government’s measures to enable 
active citizen engagement fall short of  listening to citizens. When 
citizens are making themselves heard, government actors often do not 
listen because they do not like the sound of  what people are saying to 
them: that they have massive needs for very basic services, and that they 
do not like to see powerful government figures waste public funds while 
their needs go unsatisfied.
3.3 South Africa: when policy champions move away
One of  the largest-ever single collaborative efforts between South 
Africa’s Department of  Welfare and civil society was the restructuring 
of  the country’s social grant system. Social grants have always been part 
of  South Africa’s welfare system, dating as far back as the early 1900s. 
Under apartheid a state maintenance grant (SMG) was provided, but 
most of  the recipients were white. In the transition from apartheid to 
a democratic government, the Department of  Welfare drafted its 1997 
White Paper for Social Welfare, delineating a new vision for extending social 
welfare. It looked beyond merely keeping the poor above the poverty 
line towards a vision of  developing communities and empowering the 
poor to thrive, to weaken their dependence on government transfers. It 
acknowledges that the government cannot do away with poverty and 
income equality alone, and emphasised the need for civil society to 
facilitate much of  the change. State and civil society together made a 
strong case for replacing the SMG with the Child Support Grant (CSG), 
the first welfare tool to de-racialise the welfare system and support those 
in need.
The policy champions behind these changes were led by Francie Lund 
(Chair of  the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support, which 
assisted with the conceptualisation and implementation of  the CSG), 
Geraldine Fraser Moleketi (Minister of  Welfare), Leila Patel (Director 
General of  Welfare), and a host of  actors from the apartheid resistance 
movement, social workers’ associations, unions and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Both Lund and Patel had extensive experience 
in academia prior to their involvement with the Department of  
Welfare and were also trained as social workers earlier in their careers. 
Moleketi, on the other hand, had little knowledge of  welfare but was 
highly respected within the Tripartite Alliance (between the African 
National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party, and 
the Congress of  South African trade unions) that made up the ruling 
government in 1994.
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After the end of  apartheid, the mass unity that was needed to fight 
against an oppressive regime diverged, as did the interests of  the 
various actors involved in welfare. The champions involved in the 
conceptualisation and implementation of  progressive social grant 
policies left shortly after the White Paper was passed in 1997, leaving a 
gap in technical expertise in the Department of  Welfare.3 Their absence 
led to a gradual departure from the original vision and momentum. 
While policy champions are unlikely to stay in the tiers of  government 
over a number of  decades, ensuring the success of  a policy promoting 
developmental social welfare ideals would have required at least some 
actors prepared to maintain the original vision. Alternatively, new 
champions need to come up with new ideas on social change in welfare.
A shift towards developmental social welfare policy requires not only 
significant technical and managerial support, but also – most critically – 
an understanding of  the landscape of  welfare in South Africa. In 1994, 
the Department of  Welfare included a number of  technical experts who 
had both a foundation in theory as well as practical implementation 
through their social work background. They also consulted a number 
of  experts in the field to develop new welfare policies. While the 
administrative capacity and infrastructure of  the welfare system is 
well established today, technical expertise and innovation is limited. 
In addition, the window of  opportunity to change policy is unlike 
that which existed 20 years ago. South Africa’s social welfare system 
has produced a number of  positive outcomes through social grants, 
but there seems to be a lack of  urgency. Politics ultimately determine 
which services are funded, and social grants – seen as a ‘vote-catching’ 
tool – make the government unlikely to move resources away to other 
areas requiring funding. The critical success factors for policies such 
as the CSG being implemented include credible leadership, diverse 
practical expertise in the areas that drive change, strong administrative 
capacity, and the confidence of  politicians (Patel 2014). The DSD 
leadership today is far less consultative, academia works independently 
from government – often criticising government actions from afar – 
and NGOs have limited capacity to advocate change as they are often 
subcontracted to and financially dependent on the state through their 
service provision activities.
After the regime change in 1994, poverty levels in South Africa declined, 
mostly due to the impact of  the social grant system (Van der Berg 2010). 
Yet while social grants have moved individuals out of  poverty, inequality 
remains persistently high. When the champions of  the White Paper left, 
so too did their teams, and with that key advocates of  the developmental 
welfare model were lost. Policies such as the CSG had very detailed 
implementation plans, but welfare services overall were less detailed. 
Today, South Africa’s welfare budget favours social assistance in the form 
of  cash transfers. Over the past 20 years, policymakers have been unable 
– or unwilling – to shift from the notion of  poverty reduction to a vision 
of  inclusive growth that reduces income inequality.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 1 January 2016: ‘Opening Governance’ 55–68 | 63
Institute of Development Studies | www.bulletin.ids.ac.uk
3.4 Tanzania: when the state does not like to listen
Since 1995, the year that Tanzania held its first multi-party elections, 
the government has come up with three policies for reaching universal 
primary education (UPE), one of  Tanzania’s aims since Independence. By 
the end of  the 1970s, the state – through a determined effort that involved 
allocating a serious proportion of  its national budget to education, 
increasing the number of  schools and teachers, making primary schooling 
compulsory and free – almost attained UPE. But it could not afford to 
sustain this effort and, with pressure from the international financial 
institutions (IFIs), from the early 1980s it decreased the overall percentage 
of  GDP allocated to education, shifted its educational policy towards cost-
sharing, and introduced enrolment fees (URT 1993).
Education was a contentious and highly debated topic in the run-up 
to the first multi-party elections. To revitalise the education sector, the 
government released its Education and Training Master Plan, a centrally-
planned policy with input from academics and donors. Although 
there was an expectation by CSOs that this policy would increase the 
participation of  citizens in making key decisions in the education sector, 
neither CSOs nor citizens were part of  the process of  formulating this 
policy. Government officials, including those who were in charge of  
the sector at the time, felt that the policy recognised the importance of  
expert views of  the problems facing the education sector, and that it 
clearly stated future directions and what was needed to take education 
in the planned direction. CSOs, though, were quick to highlight that the 
quality of  education remained poor because the government did not 
involve citizens and other education stakeholders in the sector.
The government could only afford to implement changes in primary 
education five years later, when through its Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper it became eligible for debt relief. With heavy involvement from 
donors and IFIs, channelled financially and ideologically through the 
Millennium Development Goals, the government created in 2001 
the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). This included an 
increase in teacher recruitment, investment for new buildings, the 
abolition of  school fees, and the empowerment of  school committees. 
Under PEDP, donors agreed to come together and fund education as 
one entity, rather than a myriad of  projects. But citizen involvement 
was limited to consultations, especially during the planning stages. 
As PEDP progressed, CSOs started flagging that drastic increases in 
the quantity of  teachers were coming at the expense of  quality: the 
newly-hired teachers had not been trained properly; students were not 
progressing to secondary education; and the focus on publicly-funded 
primary education was happening at the expense of  publicly-funded 
secondary education. Parents that could afford to shifted their children 
to the private sector, accelerating the creation of  a class-based two-tier 
education system (HakiElimu 2008).
While in the early 2000s the initial increase in school enrolments made 
citizens happy with the state of  education in Tanzania, by the end of  
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the decade there was a growing discontent. By 2008, PEDP was halted, 
and the government started a series of  consultations with different 
stakeholders, including many of  the CSOs that had been more vocal 
about changing the education and training policy. The 2014 Education 
and Training Policy Plan came out in 2014, but there was little sense that 
the comments of  those consulted were reflected in the final document. 
According to some who participated, they were called into certain 
meetings to provide inputs towards a new planned education and 
training policy, but few of  the things that they suggested were reflected in 
the final document. As the issue once more became a media discussion 
point in pre-election year, the president launched another consultation 
after the launch of  the report. It is not clear at this stage how, or whether, 
the final policy document could be revised to incorporate stakeholders’ 
comments, given that it has already been launched.
The relationship between the Tanzanian state and CSOs has been one 
of  ‘pointing hands’ at each other. Discussions with both government 
officers and CSOs working on education suggest that there is an 
antagonistic relationship between the state and CSOs. Government 
officials do not like to listen to CSOs because they feel that they know 
what the problems with education are, and that they know how to 
solve them. While acknowledging that CSOs have a positive role in 
highlighting some of  these problems, they are not happy with the fact 
that CSOs release their findings and critiques to the public through 
the media – with whom government officers and politicians also have 
an antagonistic relationship – rather than to government first. Public 
officials would prefer it if  CSOs identified research priorities with 
government departments responsible for education; if  research is done 
in collaboration with the government, they will own the findings and 
thus make implementation easier. The high number of  CSOs in the 
education sector puts forth a multitude of  proposals, with which the 
government has neither the time nor the capacity to deal. On the other 
side of  the equation citizens that attended public meetings state that 
they do not raise issues as they claim the government rarely listens to 
their voices, especially on policy (REPOA 2012). CSOs add to this view 
by saying that their voice is ‘out there’, but it never appears in official 
documents.
4 Voice, responsiveness and political competition
These cases all illustrate the limitations as well as the potential of  citizen 
engagement and of  the role of  changing coalitions within government. 
Across all cases, actors within and outside the state had a common sense 
of  urgency to make health care or education universal, to increase the 
access of  welfare to a previously marginalised population, or to use 
new technologies to fight corruption and create jobs. They also shared 
a sense of  aiming for a common goal, for an accountable responsive 
state, even if  different actors understood it differently. Each case 
happened during a political moment in each country’s recent history 
when citizens were also more assertive, willing to engage directly with 
government officers and politicians. These citizens made use of  the 
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political enabling environment to collectivise and coordinate citizen 
voice with reforms that could increase public sector responsiveness, 
what Fox (2015) calls a strategy for pro-accountability change. As seen 
elsewhere (Srinivasan 2014), increased citizen voice does not always 
translate into increased services; in vibrant democracies there needs to 
be a political competition for votes aligned with pressure from citizen 
groups for universal rather than targeted service provision. But while in 
all cases there was an increase in citizen voice and political competition, 
concertation moments emerged in some cases but not in others.
We can see concertation moments in the initial policy formulation in both 
the Ghanaian and South African cases, with task forces composed of  
reform-minded public officials and politicians together with empowered 
citizen groups, not only sitting together and discussing possibilities, but 
also acting together and drafting policies. Over time, there is a shift in 
Ghana when government changes, and the new ruling party opts to hire a 
consultancy firm and starts listening instead of  concerting.
In South Africa the situation goes a step further, when policy champions 
either go away or are co-opted by the state, and shift from being advocates 
to being those who deliver policy, and the state goes from concerting with 
citizen groups to hearing them. Although it had a short concertation 
moment, with a coalition government drafting a new constitution, 
Kenya’s case is punctuated by moments of  listening and hearing, where a 
lot of  concertation and consultation appears to be politics for show, rather 
than authentic engagement from the side of  the state. Finally, Tanzania 
is the only case where we do not see any concertation moments. The 
country has its listening and hearing moments, but most of  the time it 
seems the state firmly believes it knows how to run the show and does 
not need to engage with citizens, except to consult with them after the 
drafting of  policies. The Tanzanian case is also the only one of  these 
where there was no change in government, meaning the political actors 
were the same before and after the democratic shift.
5 Concluding remarks
There are few instances of  strong citizen voice making a significant 
difference in policy processes in sub-Saharan Africa. We looked 
at key historical policies across four countries at major junctures 
of  democratisation to see how actors within and outside the state 
interacted for accountable governance. We divided this interaction into 
three kinds of  moments: concertation, consultation and hearing. We see 
concertation moments as synergies between citizen voice and the state’s 
capacity to respond (Fox 2015), where coalitions bridge the state–society 
divide to attain some aspect of  accountable governance. We also noticed 
that political competition is an important element but that, like citizen 
voice, political competition alone is not sufficient to achieve accountable 
governance.
Concertation moments, though, are not permanent. For instance, in 
both Ghana and South Africa there was a concertation moment during 
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policy design, but it got lost during implementation. Concertation needs 
to be ongoing, and needs to be a process: a strategy more than a tactic 
(Fox 2015). Yet, as we see in our cases, many times state actors prefer 
consultation rather than concertation: they do not believe citizen voice 
is knowledgeable in ‘matters of  the state’, they do not like to hear what 
these voices are saying, or are simply practitioners of  politics for show. 
Yet they still ‘engage’ with these voices to claim legitimacy in national 
and international eyes, using even passive listening as a rubber stamp 
to authenticate policy processes with the mark of  ‘citizen participation’. 
This is why, when researching accountable governance, we need to 
differentiate between hearing, listening and concerting.
Notes
* The research on which this article is based was funded by the 
Research, Evidence and Learning Component of  Making All Voices 
Count.
1  Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
2  In the sense intended by Arendt (1958).
3  Now known as the Department of  Social Development (DSD).
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